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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the interaction 
of socio-economic and political variables that have 
contributed to Argentina's instability using Samuel P. 
Huntington's theory of political institutionalization.
This analysis outlines the destabilizing patterns 
emerging from the Radical and Peronist periods in Argentine 
history and considers the implications of these processes 
for the current government of President Radi Alfonsin.
The degree of political instability linked with the 
mass movements during these two periods appears to be 
positively associated with: electoral strategies using
populistic appeals to the mobilized masses, the informal 
and personalistic character of the state, and the lack of 
widespread acceptance of a single set of political rules 
to govern behavior.
The results of this study point to the relevance of 
Huntington's concept of political decay for explaining the 
chronic instability plaguing Argentina. It is suggested 
that the most important task confronting President Alfonsin 
is the establishment of adaptable, complex, autonomous, and 
legitimate political institutions and practices*
SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL 
DECAY IN ARGENTINA
h
INTRODUCTION
This thesis analyzes the impact of modernization on 
Argentina's political processes. Specifically, it is a study 
of the factors which have contributed to Argentina's political 
instability. One school of thought argues that rapid socio­
economic transformation created pressures which by their 
intensity simply overwhelmed the political system. According 
to this view, large-scale immigration, sudden economic growth, 
urbanization, and the onslaught of industrialization gave rise
to social forces which have been locked in a continuous
1
struggle with each other for power.
Another school of thought stresses the importance of the
political system's institutional capacity. According to this
view, politics failed. The actions of political leaders and
institutions in meeting certain crises led to the demise of 
2
the system. To understand Argentina’s climate of instability, 
it is therefore necessary to study the sources of political 
weakness•
The central questions to be answered in this thesis focus
on the relationship between rapid social change and the
political processes in Argentina. One important area of
investigation is the impact of new social groups dh the
Argentine political process. Another deals with the
2.
3.
political institutions themselves: how much did they
contribute to their own demise?
To reach some conclusions about these matters, it is 
necessary to understand how the interaction of socio-economic 
forces and political structures can produce instability. The 
first chapter provides a theoretical framework that explains 
how and why social mobilization, economic development, and the 
strength of political institutions affect the level of 
instability in a given country. The second chapter applies 
this approach to the Radical period in Argentine politics.
The third chapter examines the Peronist period from the same 
perspective. The fourth chapter then suggests some 
implications, based on this analysis, for the current 
administration of President Radi Alfonsin. Finally, the 
conclusion highlights the destabilizing processes that have 
contributed to Argentina's political instability.
//
NOTES FOR INTRODUCTION
1
See: Gino Germani, Politica y sociedad en una epoca de 
transicion (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 1962).
2
Peter H. Smith, Argentina and the Failure of Democracy: 
Conflict among Political Elites, 1904-1955 (Madison, 
Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), p. 89.
CHAPTER I
THEORY AND PROPOSITIONS
This chapter seeks to explain how social mobilization, 
economic development, and the strength of political 
institutions affect the level of political stability 
in Argentina. First, the concepts are defined and 
clarified. Second, the relationships between these 
independent variables and political stability are examined.
I• Independent Variables
SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
Karl Deutsch defines social mobilization as:
The process in which major clusters of old social, 
economic, and psychological commitments are eroded 
or broken and people become available for new 
patterns of socialization of behavior.
This is what occurs to a large number of people in areas
undergoing modernization. Deutsch suggests that social
mobilization can be measured according to the percentage of
the population:
(1) that is exposed to important aspects of 
modern life,
(2) that is exposed to mass media,
(3) that has changed its residence location,
5.
(4) that is living in towns (or cities of 
a certain size),
(5) that is employed in non-agricultural 
occupations,
(6) that is literate, and
(7) by conges in the per capita gross national 
product.
According to Deutsch, a "threshold of criticality" is
attained when these social factors begin to produce changes
3
in the social structure.
One of the most important analyses of the implications
of social mobilization with regard to Latin America is Gino
Germani's study of Argentine society. Following Deutsch,
Germani defines social mobilization as the psychosocial
process in which passive, traditional groups acquire their
own norms and aspirations separate from those established by
4
the previous rules. This analysis of social transition 
highlights the resulting increase or change in the nature of 
political participation. Germani posits that high levels of 
social mobilization lead to increased levels of participation. 
The political pressures are greatest after social mobilization 
reaches a threshold of significance, but before the political 
structures adjust to the new demands. In sum, when mobilized 
groups become aware of new needs, and traditional political 
structures are unwilling or unable to process rising demands, 
instability often results.
Anne L. and Peter R. Schneider argue that high rates of 
change in social mobilization may not have a significant 
correlation with political instability. Their data
7.
concerning ten West European nations indicate that, the
social mobilization process is significant, but its
importance is due to "its relationship with economic
development and institutionalization and not because of any
5
direct impact on political disorder." The Schneiders 
conclude that political instability is more likely to occur 
when social mobilization takes place faster than 
institutionalization or when social mobilization 
outruns economic development. Thus, for a fuller 
understanding of the relative importance of social 
mobilization, these authors recommend an approach that 
distinguishes between rates of change for different 
variables.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Economic development refers to the productive capacity
of a nation. Higher levels of economic development have
traditionally been associated with a moderate degree of
societal tensions. Seymour M. Lipset and others argue that,
as economic development increases, democracy increases and so
6
does political stability. In their study of political
instability, Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett find
evidence to support Lipset's claim. They point out that
both an increase in the level of per capita income and a rise
7
in the growth rate are associated with domestic stability.
This view fails to take into account how economic
/
development may cause disruptions in the social system.
In his study of the French Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville
argued that real economic conditions improved slightly before
the revolution. In response to these improved conditions,
the nobility, already weakened by the third estate's growth
in economic power, attempted to retain its medieval
privileges. The ensuing "feudal reaction" led to revolution
as "the French found their position the more unsupportable
8
in proportion to its improvement."
James C. Davies combines de Tocqueville's idea of 
frustrated expectations in a period of improving economic 
conditions with Marx's notion of misery associated with 
economic decline to build a theory of revolution. He argues 
that:
Revolutions are most likely to occur when a 
prolonged period of objective economic and 
social development is followed by a short 
period of sharp reversal. . . The crucial 
factor is the vague or specific fear that 
ground gained over a long period of time will 
be quickly lost.°
According to this perspective, economic and social progress
is usually a necessary condition for violent political change.
In order to assess the extent of societal frustration
within this framework, it is useful to examine the
distribution of income. Changes in income distribution may
be unrelated to overall growth or decline of GNP. Even in an
expanding economy, for the majority, economic development may
still be a zero-sum game. Shifts in income distribution that
represent an improvement for one group may be seen as a
decline by other groups. Therefore, economic satisfactions or
dissatisfactions may become political variables.
Bruce M. Russett, in "Inequality and Instability: The
Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," operationalized
instability by aggregating across nation units the number of
10
violent political deaths occurring between 1950-1962.
He assessed the degree of the inequitable distribution of 
land for each of these nation units with a measure of the
11
total inequality of a distribution known as the Gini Index.
The Gini Index calculates over the whole population, the 
difference between an "ideal" cumulative distribution of 
land and the actual distribution. The higher the Gini Index, 
the greater the inequality. In his correlational analysis, 
Bruce Russett illustrated the positive association between 
inequality and instability.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson define political
participation as "behavior influencing or attempting to
12
influence the distribution of public goods." This definition
rests on the notion of collective and public goods. According
to the writers, collective goods consist of "goods that when
supplied to one member of a collectivity cannot easily be
13
denied to others of the same group." Here, public goods 
refers to a collective goods provided by governments through 
governmental expenditure. Streets, national security, and 
monetary systems provide examples of public goods.
A further example of the application of this definition
in Latin American societies will more fully illustrate its
//
implications. The stability of a regime in power is a public 
good to certain citizens since stable government can ensure
10.
particular economic, social, or political arrangements
beneficial to certain sectors of society. Thus, showing
political support through attending pro-government rallies
or voting in elections constitutes participation. Similarly,
such acts as casting an invalid ballot in an election (a form
of protest) or engaging in an anti-regime movement, rally,
strike, or riot are also participation. Such actions attempt
to influence the public good through either collective support 
14
or opposition.
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Samuel P. Huntington argues that the stability of a 
modernizing political system depends on the strength of its 
political organizations and procedures. The strength of 
political institutions depends on their level of institution­
alization and their scope of support. Institutionalization 
is "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire 
value and stability," and scope of support refers to "the
extent to which the political organizations and procedures
15
encompass activity in the society."
The level of institutionalization of any political system
can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, coherence, and
16
autonomy of its organizations and procedures. If development
occurs, then so does regression. Institutions decay and lose
their effectiveness as they become more rigid, simple,
17
disorganized, and subordinate. ^
1. ADAPTABILITY-RIGIDITY
The more adaptable an organization or procedure is, the
11.
more highly institutionalized it is; the more rigid it is, the
18
lower its level of institutionalization. Adaptability is a
function of environmental challenge and age. As environments
change with time, they offer new challenges to organizations.
As Huntington points out, success in adapting to one
environmental challenge strengthens an institution's capacity
19
to deal with subsequent challenges. For example, the 
strength of a party is reflected in its ability to survive its 
founder or the charismatic leader who first brings it to 
power. Adaptability refers to a political system's ability to 
meet challenges and survive.
2. COMPLEXITY—SIMPLICITY
The more complicated an organization is, the more highly
20
institutionalized it is. Complexity involves the
establishment of organizational sub-units both hierarchically
and functionally. The greater the number and variety of
the sub-units the greater the ability of the system to
21
maintain the support of its members. For instance, parties
in modernizing societies need supporting organizational links
in order to develop mass appeals. Linkages between the party
and socio-economic organizations such as labor unions are
22
particularly valuable. Relatively simple political systems 
and institutions without supporting organizational links, on 
the other hand, are usually over-whelmed in the modernization 
process. The simplest political system is that which depends 
on one individual; it is also the least stable.
/
3. COHERENCE-DISUNITY
The more unified and coherent an organization is, the
more highly institutionalized it is.
An effective organization requires, at a minimum, 
substantial consensus on the functional boundaries 
of the group and or the procedures for resolving 
disputes which come up within those boundaries. ^
This capacity for coordination and discipline is essential inI
the field of politics. As an organization or procedure
produces a sense of group identity and morale, it increases
in coherence. The greater the disunity of an organization
24
or system, the lower its level of institutionalization.
4. AUTONOMY-SUBORDINATION
A final indicator of institutionalization is autonomy, or
the extent to which political organizations exist
independently of other social groupings. Huntington argues
that, in a highly developed political system, organizations
are "insulated" from the direct influence of nonpolitical
25
groups and procedures. Institutions are autonomous to the 
extent that they have interests and values independent from 
other institutions and social forces. Political systems 
containing organizations and procedures that are subordinate 
to the interests of one group are less likely to withstand 
the pressures of modernization.
LEGITIMACY
In the political arena, trust in institutions rests on a
cultural foundation in which ideals and expectations and
26
institutional practices are mutually reinforcing. When 
beliefs are widely shared, institutions are better''equipped 
to deal with the tensions of group conflict. As a gap develops
13.
between the beliefs in a society and government practices, 
doubt in the effectiveness of authority increases, and the
political system loses its capacity to mobilize consent and
to respond effectively to basic problems.
In an often quoted definition of legitimacy, Seymour M.
Lipset states:
Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system 
to engender and maintain the belief that the 
existing political institutions are the most 
appropriate ones for the society. '
Here, legitimacy is both affective and evaluative. According
to Lipset, "Groups will regard a political system as
legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its
28
values fit in with their primary values."
According to Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, when the
frequency of affective and evaluative orientations toward the
political structure are high, the congruence between culture
and structure promotes high levels of allegiance, or
legitimacy. This cultural approach suggests that, as
political systems move toward "allegiant" orientations, they
tend to become more stable; when the frequency of positive
feeling and attitudes approaches indifference, instability
is likely to result. As Almond and Verba point out:
Long-run political stability may be more 
dependent on a more diffuse sense of attachment 
or loyalty to the political system —  a loyalty 
not based specifically on system performance. ™
In Argentina populist impulses challenged the legitimacy
of the traditional norms and practices in society. According
n
to Jose Luis Romero, the modernization process in Argentina 
spawned new, popular, and democratic attitudes among the
14.
masses that, in part, coincided with the ideals of the 
established elites and, in part, conflicted with them. As he 
points out, “Two antagonistic political lines were drawn, and
their conflict had repercussions on the stability of the
30
institutional system." This conflict of modern values with 
traditionalism is thus the basis for Argentina's continuing 
crises of legitimacy.
II. Dependent Variables
POLITICAL STABILITY
Contemporary studies carry varied labels for political
stability: political order, integration, nation-building,
homeostatic equilibrium, government performance, etc. A
consensus exists among those who use these terms that
societies may differ in the degree in which their members
cooperate together in collective action. According to Charles
Tilly, collective action consists of people acting together
31
in pursuit of common interests. In its ideal form, the
stable polity would be able to make collective decisions and
32
have them obeyed without the application of coercion.
Although stability implies a lack of change, societies
must move forward in order to meet changing circumstances.
Developmental change is gradual and orderly. A polity is
evolving —  hence remains stable —  if changes are taking
place in the direction of increased harmony among its 
33
components. Such change results from regularized^contests 
for power and from continued incremental adjustments in the 
allocation of benefits.
15.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
A polity is unstable if it neither develops toward
increased social cohesion nor functions according to
precepts widely shared by society. Political instability
in its most extreme form leads to violence. The sources of
political violence can be collective as well as elitist. Mass
violence is a manifestation of social disintegration directed
in opposition to the society or to parts of it. Instances of
collective violence include; rebellions and riots,
assassinations of public officials, guerrilla warfare,
bombings and terrorist acts, and other armed attacks.
In general, Charles Tilly defines collective violence as any
interaction that leads to the seizure or damage of persons
34
or objects, so long as resistance occurs.
Elite violence is often related to mass violence. Elite
repression may precede or follow collective violence? and
elite coups d'etat may also be associated with the occurence
of violent collective action. According to D.A. Hibbs Jr.,
elite repression consists of "actions taken by political
authorities to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a perceived
threat to the security and stability of the government, the
35
regime, or the state itself." Coups, on the other hand, are
illegal attempts to overthrow the government by a particular
segment of the population, coalitions and factions of
disaffected individuals within the administration or ruling
36
party, and (commonly in Latin America) the militar^.
III. Toward a Framework for Analysis
16.
HUNTINGTON'S SYNTHESIS
Samuel P. Huntington provides one of the most balanced
development theories dealing with questions of political
stability. In Political Order in Changing Societies# he
argues that the domestic violence and instability of the
1950s and the 1960s, "was in large part the product of rapid
social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into
politics, coupled with the slow development of political 
37
institutions." His theory is appealing in its examination
of three factors —  rapid social change, mobilization, and
political institutionalization.
For Huntington, the focus of political change is the
interaction between rapid mobilization and
institutionalization. The impact of modernization on
political stability is determined by the relationships
between social mobilization and economic development, social
frustration and non-political mobility opportunities, and
political participation and political institutionalization.
Huntington expresses these relationships in a series of 
38
ratios:
(1) Social mobilization —  Social frustration 
■Economic development
(2) Social frustration —  Political participation
Mobility opportunities
(3) Political participation ^  Political instability 
Institutionalization ,f
Huntington thus integrates elements of both the socio-
17.
economic and the political systems into a single framework 
seeking to explain how political instability occurs.
Keeping these two broad areas of concentration in mind, 
his general theory can be simplified into two ratios:
(1) Social mobilization —  Political participation 
Satisfaction
(2) Political participation   ^Political instability
Institutionalization
The processes expressed by these ratios read as follows: To
the extent that demands generated by social mobilization are
not satisfied in the socio-economic realm, they will generate
political participation or demands placed on the political
system. If the system is sufficiently institutionalized to
handle these demands, order will be maintained. If demands
exceed the system's management capacity, instability will
result.
MODIFYING HUNTINGTON'S THEORY
In his study testing the theory's relevance to Latin
America, J. Mark Ruhl questions Huntington's assumption that
higher economic development produces satisfaction. As he
points out, "The economic development level may be less
important than the degree to which economic benefits are
39
distributed equally." Taking this point into account, a 
revised version of Huntington's theory might introduce an 
alternative measure of socio-economic satisfaction, labeled
"distribution." The modified theory would read: political
b
participation demands are created to the extent that social 
mobilization pressures are not diffused by more equitable
18.
income distribution.
Huntington's operationalization of political
institutionalization must also be revised to describe with
precision the political institutions most "appropriate"
for handling the socio-cultural changes occurring in
Argentine society. A strong or appropriate political system
would be characterized by:
(1) ADAPTABILITY (flexibility to articulate 
and aggregate new demands),
(2) COMPLEXITY (institutional linkages to 
socio-economic groups and organizations),
(3) AUTONOMY (independent structure of 
national government), and
(4) LEGITIMACY (as perceived by society).
In constructing this index of institutionalization, one
of Huntington's indicators (coherence) is dropped from
consideration because of problems in operationalizing the
concept with respect to Argentina's political development.
The coherence of political institutions might be estimated by
determining the percentage of positions in the Senate held
by the majority party, the total of different parties
represented in the Senate, the number of parties in the
Chamber of Deputies, and the percentage of seats held by the
largest party. Nations scoring high on coherence are usually
those in which a smaller number of parties hold stronger
40
control of the upper and lower legislative bodies. However, 
Argentina during the Radical and Peronist periods under 
consideration in this study moved politically toward becoming 
a one-party state. Consequently, the extremely high scores on
19.
coherence during these periods would result in a distortion of 
the relationship between this indicator and the other
indicators of institutionalization.
The index of institutionalization involves four separate
factors: the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and
legitimacy of political institutions. Following Huntington,
an important aspect of adaptability is the percentage of the
vote gained by "surge" parties —  parties which appear
suddenly and appeal to a particular group or have rather
41
specific or limited issue appeals. An adaptable party 
system should be able to aggregate the interests represented 
by these surge parties, thus inhibiting their appearance.
Complexity of government is the second indicator on the 
institutionalization index. The extent of decentralization 
of government in the society is used to estimate complexity. 
This measure represents a comprehensive governmental structure 
which provides citizens with more possibilities for inputs.
The extent of decentralization is estimated by examining the 
strength of linkages between the central government and 
important groups and organizations in society.
Autonomy is estimated by examining the independence of 
national government institutions from control by outside 
organizations or groups. Additionally, this indicator 
measures the ability of these structures to guide and direct 
members of society rather than their being manipulated by
powerful individuals. An organization that is sufficiently
>!
autonomous to orient the roles of its members will have a life 
of its own greater than the sum of its parts; it will be
42
institutionalized.
Legitmacy is estimated by using Robert Dahl's concept of 
43
opposition. Opposition to the structure of government, 
rather than to policies or personnel, is considered to 
represent the perception that the structures are not 
legitimate. The mobilization of groups and parties which 
oppose the system is used to indicate the onset of a crisis 
of legitimacy.
By adding these elements to the theory, the equations 
would read:
(1) Social mobilization   Participation
Distribution
(2) Participation _ Instability
Institutionalization
The process expressed by these relationships would translate
as: To the extent that demands generated by social
mobilization are not satisfied by the distribution of
economic benefits, they will stimulate political
participation. If adaptable, complex, autonomous, and
legitimate institutions exist, order will be maintained.
As institutions become more rigid, simple, subordinate, and
people no longer value or utilize them, instability is likely
to result.
SOME PROPOSITIONS
The relationships presented in this revised version 
of Huntington's theory provide a basis for generating 
propositions about political instability in Argentina.
21.
However, a major problem with this approach is its lack 
of any precise definitions for political instability.
Huntington chooses instead to treat terms like "instability"
and "violence" in summary fashion without specifying what
these terms entail. As Charles Tilly points outs
To accept the Huntington theory confidently, 
one would also want clear distinctions among 
radicalism, instability, violence, extent of 
protest, and propensity to revolution not to 
mention a specification of their relationships 
to each other. 44
Huntington never clears this difficulty.
Taking into account this caveat concerning Huntington's
theory, it is necessary to designate the forms of instability
that may result from the interaction of the main variables.
This analysis of instability in Argentina will make
distinctions about political instability based on the
discussion of dependent variables earlier in this chapter.
Political violence can be collective as well as elitist.
Drawing from these modifications to Huntington's theory,
this study considers the following propositions:
(1) Rapid economic development unevenly distributed, 
accompanied by high levels of social mobilization, 
led to the participation of new groups in Argentine 
politics.
(2) The participation of new groups in politics 
coupled with the decay of institutions led to 
outbreaks of elite violence.
In order to evaluate these propositions, it is 
necessary to set forth a framework for analysis to apply to 
the two periods of major social and political upheaval in 
modern Argentine history. To facilitate this examination of 
the interaction of independent variables during each period,
2 2 .
this framework places developments in the socio-economic 
realm (economic distribution and social mobilization),
under the heading of "Operational Environment." Developments
in the political arena (adaptability, complexity, autonomy,
and legitimacy), are grouped as part of the "Institutional
Environment." This focus on the roles and relationships of
the developmental variables should help identify the major
forces contributing to Argentina's political instability.
/
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CHAPTER II
THE RADICAL PERIOD, 1916 - 1930
In an effort to explain the failure of Argentina's 
experiment with democracy during the Radical period, this 
chapter considers, first, the socio-economic underpinnings 
of the Argentine political system and, second, the system's 
internal or structural characteristics that have contributed 
to instability.
I. Operational Environment
From the seventeenth until the late nineteenth century,
livestock provided the main products and exports of the
Pampas region. The economy developed from the hunting of
wild cattle and horses for their hides (1600-1750), to the
formation of larger herds of semi-tamed animals (1700-1850),
to the production of fats and salted meat (1800-1890), and
1
finally to sheep raising (1830-1900). At each stage, James R. 
Scobie observes, the rift between the interior and the coast 
widened, until the coast achieved dominance.
As developed in the coastal region during the late 
nineteenth century, the rural economy prospered under an 
extensive land tenure system. The acquisition and'7 
maintenance of land required financial resources and political
27.
28.
influence. Wealthy merchants developed the estancias or 
cattle ranches in the eighteenth century. These owners
generally obtained land for prestige and income but left
2
the administration and labor to foremen and gauchos.
With the establishment of the saladero, or meat-salting
plant, in Buenos Aires and at ports along the Uruguay and
Parana rivers, the landowning and cattle interests of the
coast began to consolidate their wealth and position through 
3
world trade. In the decade following 1810, the revenues from
the export of hides tripled. The introduction of the saladero
increased the yearly slaughter of cattle for salted meat from
7,000 head in the 1790s, to 60,000 in 1822, and to 350,000 by 
4
1827. To reinforce their prestige and power, those benefiting
from these developments advocated:
. . . further expansion of large landholdings; 
rejection of immigrants, crops, livestock, or any 
variation from the formula of animals and land; 
access to and control of ports and commerce; 
creation of rural peons from the vagabond gaucho 
element; jmd subordination of government to its 
control. *
Juan Manuel de Rosas became the leading proponent of
this cattle civilization. After becoming governor of
Buenos Aires in 1835, he contributed to the estancia-saladero
interests with a massive land give-away program. The military
received large grants for service in the Indian wars,
holders of public bonds took over large areas, and sales
6
favored political supporters. These policies made the coast
a land of ports, estancias, and animals, while increasingly—
alienating the economic interests of the interior.
With the fall of Rosas in 1852, the economy shifted away
from the estancias and saladeros toward sheep raising. Wool
exports rose from an average of 6,000 tons annually in the
1840s to 11,000 in the 1850s, 50,000 in the 1860s, 80,000 in
the 1870s, and 120,000 in the 1880s. By the latter decade,
wool comprised 50 to 60 percent of the value of Argentina's 
7
exports. The sheep economy marked the transition from the
colonial estancia and saladero to the modern estancias that
emerged on the coast in the late nineteenth century.
The export sector dominated Argentina*s economy and
society between 1890 and 1914. Argentina's principal exports
were agricultural products, including wheat, maize, linseed,
8
hides, wool, and beef. Between 1880 and 1910, the value of
exports increased sixfold. After 1860, total production
expanded to an annual average of 5 percent, population
by 3.4 percent, the crop area by 8.3 percent, and the railway
9
system by 15.4 percent. Alongside various European countries 
and the United States, Argentina appeared to be on the verge 
of becoming one of the great nations of the world.
Some archaic characteristics of the Argentine economy 
persisted into the twentieth century as large landholdings 
remained intact. Despite sporadic attempts to change 
traditional arrangements, few among the elite wanted to modify 
the status quo. By the mid-nineteenth century, concentrated
10
distribution of land ownership became an institutional norm. 
Powerful landed oligarchs emerged as a dominant force in the
political and economic life of the nation. Some 400 families
//
linked by clubs and private associations formed the core of 
the elite. As David Rock states, "It has been estimated that
30.
less than 2,000 persons in Argentina owned as much land as the
total areas of Italy, Belgium, Holland and Denmark added 
11
together."
Because of this concentration of economic and political 
power, the years between 1880 and 1912 are frequently 
referred to as the period of the "oligarchy." The elite 
used its leverage to control the state which served as a 
major source of credit and contacts with foreign investors.
To maintain its control over the state apparatus, the 
oligarchy set up a system of "disguised repression" to
12
restrict the access of other groups to political office.
The resulting political structure, which emerged at the end
of the nineteenth century, was based on organized fraud.
This process perpetuated the myth of constitutional
liberties, while removing any threat posed by an expanding
electorate. Coupled with fraud, the oligarchy resorted to
the widespread use of rewards for political loyalties. With
its distribution of government offices, the state became a
source of political patronage.
The European immigrants to the Rio de la Plata after 1870
had little chance to acquire land. Given high real estate
values in the province of Buenos Aires, the controlling cattle
and sheep interests had no intention of subdividing and
13
selling their property. Therefore, in the Buenos Aires 
region, the immigrant became a tenant farmer. Landowners
accepted the European immigrants with the expectation that
//
they would be employed as laborers. With the ownership of 
land out of their reach, the immigrants opted to travel to
31.
Argentina's port cities to establish themselves in rapidly- 
increasing urban service occupations.
SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
Between 1857 and 1916, 4,758,729 immigrants entered the 
14
country. The flood of immigration during this period
contributed to the rapid growth of urban areas. The growth
of urban society during these years was in many respects
as politically significant as the transformation of Argentina
under the landed elites. By 1914 foreigners made up 30
15
percent of Argentina's population. The majority of the new
arrivals settled in the urbanizing province of Buenos Aires.
(See Table 2.1).
These immigrants rapidly integrated into society.
European customs easily blended with the Hispanic traditions
of Argentina. Both cultures shared many things in common.
According to one account:
Like the colonial Spaniard, they (the immigrants) 
placed particular emphasis on dignity, outward 
appearance, and dress, and displayed a fatalistic 
attitude toward life along with their fondness for 
gambling.
The receptive attitude of Argentines toward the newcomers
promoted their absorption. The nation's constitutions,
treaties, and laws gave preferential treatment to European
immigrants. By the early twentieth century, the culture
appeared to be "Italianized Hispanic" as the population
17
increasingly asserted its "Argentinism."
h
The geographical and occupational concentration of 
foreigners affected the balance of the social system. The
32
TABLE 2.1
PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGNERS IN TOTAL POPULATION 
OF EACH CATEGORY OF COUNTIES CLASSIFIED * 
ACCORDING TO SIZE OF URBAN CENTERS, 1869-1914
ZONE 1869 1895 1914
Greater Buenos Aires 47 50 49
Other Cities of 100,000 
or more 9 34 35
Urban Centers of 50,000 
to 99,999 8 18 22
Urban Centers of 20,000 
to 49,999 12 23 26
Urban Centers of 2,000 
to 19,999 7 19 23
Urban Centers of less than 
2,000 and Populations 
outside of Urban Centers
3 9 19
*
Counties classified according to size of major urban center, 
taking the population existing in 1947 (uniform areas).
Source: Gino Germani, Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National
Populism (New Brunswick, New Jersey: ‘Transaction
Books, 1978), p. 138.
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large influx of immigrants to the central areas created a new
society composed of groups with different native origins who
nonetheless considered themselves to be Argentines. The new
immigrant culture dominated Buenos Aires and the littoral,
while creole Argentina remained in the interior and isolated
18
sectors of the littoral.
The high rate of upward social mobility was an important
factor contributing to the ready absorption —  through
non-political channels —  of the two-thirds of the population
residing in developed regions. According to Gino Germani,
the usual pattern was for second generation immigrants to
discard their old ways in favor of a new Argentine identity.
Mobility opportunities reinforced this tendency, as sons of
immigrants emerged into a different class than that of their 
19
fathers.
The explosion in the size of the urban middle class was
an important phenomenon. This group —  concentrated in
Buenos Aires —  grew from 50,000 in 1869 to 660,000 in
1914, making it a strong political force in Argentina before 
20
World War I. The Buenos Aires middle class was divided into 
white collar workers and entrepreneurs, on the one hand, and 
professionals and administrative officials, on the other.
The former represented the lower middle class, with moderate 
economic means and virtually no social prestige. The latter 
represented the upper middle class, prosperous but not 
prestigious, which increased rapidly during the 50 years
h
before 1914. The growth rate of this sector multiplied from
4.1 percent in 1869, to 6.6 percent in 1895, and to 12.4
21
percent in 1914.
Native Argentines, not immigrants, constituted the
majority of these urban professionals and administrative 
22
officials. When the second generation Argentines appeared,
they began to compete for positions in the professions and
state administration. Broadly speaking, these career patterns
meant that the elite-controlled state managed the mechanisms
of middle-class mobility: it could increase spending and
widen access to the middle-class groups in high-status
23
positions, or it could restrict them.
ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION
The high proportion of exports in Argentina's total
output conditioned economic development during the period
from 1860 to 1930. Fluctuations in the terms of trade
exerted a major influence on the functioning of Argentina’s
primary-export economy. Aldo Ferrer asserts that the
Argentine economy was vulnerable at three different but
interdependent levels: employment and domestic income,
24
balance of payments, and public finance.
During the late nineteenth century, the agricultural
and livestock sector employed 35 percent of the labor force
25
and 25 percent of existing capital. Wages, rents, profits, 
and interest (income accruing to workers, proprietors, and 
rural entrepreneurs) depended directly on the value of 
exports. An expansion of exports not only raised yfhe level 
of employment and income of the population involved with
35.
agriculture but also determined the growth of the economy
as a whole through the multiplier effect of the initial
26
increase in income- This higher income of agricultural 
workers and entrepreneurs was spent partly on imports and 
partly on consumption and investment in the domestic market. 
The proportion of income spent in Argentina generated 
employment of labor and capital which translated into wages 
and profits for workers engaged in the domestically-oriented 
sectors.
When exports declined, the farm producers received less
income and reduced their purchases of both imports and
internally-produced goods and services. This resulted in
the unemployment of capital and labor in the sectors supplying
the domestic market and produced a subsequent drop in incomes
and expenditures in these sectors.
A decline in exports brought about a balance-of-payments
deficit. Yet, with the introduction of a system of
inconvertible paper currency in 1885, the money supply
became independent of the net balance of transactions with
27
the rest of the world. The banks increased the money
supply by issuing currency to the government in exchange for
bonds. However, from this followed an inflationary cycle of
increased paper circulation to meet government expenditures
and to stimulate further economic growth. As James R. Scobie
notes, "the Juarez Celman administration in 1890 even
28
resorted to clandestine printing of banknotes•"
h
During the forty years of inconvertibility within the 
primary-exports economy, fluctuations in the exchange rate
and price instability affected income distribution. When
currency depreciated, the export sector increased its peso
income in proportion to the depreciation. The depreciation
raised domestic prices, first of agricultural and livestock
products, which were a major item of expenditure by lower-
income groups, and second of manufactured and imported
commodities, which represented a significant share of total 
29
consumption. Consequently, inflation intensified the
structural factors that conditioned income distribution and
the level of wages. It discouraged the entrance of immigrants
into Argentina and even led to the emigration of those who
30
had arrived earlier.
During the latter years of the 1880s, popular
dissatisfaction emerged over the worsening economic conditions
and the lack of government responsiveness. The severe
inflation initially benefited the exporter and the estanciero,
who paid their local costs in depreciating paper and
31
received pounds sterling for their products. Yet, these
conditions brought economic hardship to the small merchant,
the worker, and the immigrant farmer. Indicative of the
severity of the inflation and the rapid decline in value of
the paper peso; the salary in gold or gold equivalent
for a skilled worker in Buenos Aires dropped from an average
32
of 1.95 pesos in 1885 to 81 centavos in 1891. Nonetheless, 
the governments of the period maintained close ties to the
cattle export interests and promoted policies favored by
//
those interests. The policies of the "order and progress" 
administration of Julio A. Roca (1880-1886) and Juarez Celman
37.
33
(1886-1890) laid the foundations for disaster.
The economic crisis which emerged in 1890 took its name 
from the banking firm of Baring Brothers of Great Britain. 
Baring was the first international banking firm to raise 
money for Argentina in Europe, and in 1890 it faced bank­
ruptcy. It had undertaken to pay the contractors who had 
built the large port works in Buenos Aires. In return it 
received bonds from the Argentine government with a value of 
approximately 25 million dollars. Unfortunately, Baring 
discovered that it could not market these bonds. Confidence
in the capacity of the Argentine government to pay had 
34
vanished.
The failure of the loan caused a panic; new British 
investment halted, and Argentina's prices on the world market 
declined (export earnings fell by approximately 25 percent).
A commercial depression in Argentina ensued as unemployment
35
grew and real wages in Buenos Aires fell almost 50 percent. 
Throughout 1890 thousands of new immigrants were unemployed 
in Buenos Aires. Severe distress affected importers and 
artisans; public employees were dismissed as the government 
attempted to cut back on its expenditures. Years of breakneck 
economic expansion followed by financial and commercial 
collapse produced the Revolucion de la Noventa.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
In 1890, 1893, and 1905 three significant armed uprisings
7
occured in reaction to the continuing economic crisis and 
institutional grievances. The first of these —  known as
38.
"La Noventa" —  was important both in its demonstration of the 
depth of discontent and in its catalytic effect on the
36
movement which was to become the Union Civica Radical.
Disillusioned by the escallating inflation and corrupt
government, the middle classes began to damand a voice in
politics. Mainly composed of university students and
professional men, a protest movement formed in Buenos Aires.
On September 1, 1889, a group of about 3,000 persons met to
establish the Unidn Civica de la Juventad. According to its
statement of principles, this group stood for civil liberties,
free and fair suffrage, guaranteed autonomy for the provinces
and municipalities, more honest administration, and an effort
to improve the performance of public duties. On April 13,
1890 a specific political group —  the Union Civica —  was
37
organized under the leadership of Leandro N. Alem.
Protests among immigrant farmers for better conditions of 
tenure and for harvest payment in gold rather than the 
devaluing paper peso began in the 1880s, while the financial 
crisis of 1890 ruined many small and medium manufacturers, 
swelling the opposition to the Juarez Celman government. The 
military had its own complaint against the administration. 
Dissident junior officers and generals joined the protest 
activity.
After the revolt began, military elements supported 
civilians in street fighting in Buenos Aires that lasted
for three days. However, the lack of coordination between
/
the civilians and military men permitted national authorities 
to bring in reinforcements from garrisons in Rosario and
39.
38Cordoba. The insurgents failed in their attempt to overthrow
the government, but the revolt was put down only after a
promise of total amnesty to the participants, leading to
39the resignation of President Juarez Celman.
The Union Civica gained its first electoral victory in
March 1891 when Leandro N. Alem and Arist6bulo del Valle were
elected national senators from the federal district. Acrimony
followed as internal dissension dominated a meeting of the
Union Civica*s national committee on June 26, 1891. A faction
headed by Bartolom^ Mitre adopted the name Uni<5n Civica
Nacional and sought an accord with the governing groups.
Adopting the title of the Union Civica Radical under the
leadership of Alem, the remaining members called for
"relentless struggle" against the governing oligarchy.
Speaking at a mass meeting in December 1891, Alem said:
"They have called us intransigent radicals and we have
accepted this name with pride; and with pride our program
40
is intransigent."
A schism developed within the Union Civica Radical between
Alem and his nephew Hip<5lito Yrigoyen. In 1893 this rivalry
resulted in two revolutionary plots —  Yrigoyen's insurrection
in the province of Buenos Aires and Alem's uprising in Santa
Fe. Both failed and the movement remained divided. However,
Alem's suicide in 1896 put Yrigoyen in command.
After a period of generally improving economic conditions,
the revolt of 1905 did not draw the popular support which went
41
to the earlier two uprisings. Nonetheless, it caused the
government to declare a state of siege in which the police 
closed labor unions and arrested labor leaders. It also 
caused some of the members of the governing elite to begin 
thinking seriously about the need to adjust politics to the 
changing social structure of the nation.
II. Institutional Environment
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
To Yrigoyen, Argentina needed a regeneration in public
morality. His slogans —  national reparation, the cause,
morality —  often sounded more religious than political. He
42
once characterized Radicalism as a "civic religion." Free 
elections and compliance with the constitution were about the 
only things on the U.C.R. political agenda during the years 
before 1916.
Yrigoyen*s intransigence was twofold —  electoral 
abstention and refusal to participate in coalition 
governments. Since 1892 Yrigoyen repeatedly refused offers 
for official preferment. Similarly, he was at the forefront 
of the movement's boycott of elections on the ground that the 
balloting was fraudulent. However, not all Radicals agreed 
with Yrigoyen that the movement's only road to power was 
through revolution.
Internal conflict developed between those who wanted the 
U.C.R. to look and act like a political party and those who 
considered it a movement destined to reform the nation through 
revolution. Several provincial Radical parties went against
Yrigoyen and prepared to enter elections. After the passage 
of the Saenz Pena electoral reform in 1911-12, the party's
national committee authorized limited political participation
43
against the leader's views.
In spite if U.C.R. skepticism about the enforcement of 
the new law, the Radicals won the 1912 election for national 
deputies in the capital and in the province of Santa Fe and 
secured minority representation in the provinces of Buenos 
Aires, Cordoba, and Entre Rios. The Radical bloc in the 
Chamber of Deputies grew to 28 in 1914 with further victories 
in Entre Rios and Santa Fe and minority representation from
44
the capital, Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Corrientes, and Mendoza.
In the April 2, 1916 presidential election, the U.C.R. 
received a larger popular vote than all the other parties 
combined. The Radicals maintained or improved their positions 
in the capital, Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Corrientes, Entre Rios, 
Mendoza, and Santa Fe. They simultaneously obtained first­
time victories in Santiago del Estero and Tucuman. This
election increased the U.C.R. bloc in the Chamber of Deputies
45
to more than one-third of the Chamber.
Although Yrigoyen attracted a large popular vote,
he did not gain the 151 electoral votes needed to win the
presidency. The so-called Dissident Radicals of Santa Fe
held the key to the election. This group controlled that
province, and their 19 electoral votes could have given the
victory to Yrigoyen. Great suspense and back-stage dealing
ensued, and when the electoral college met on July 20 the
46
Santa Fe dissidents cast their 19 votes for Yrigoyen.
42.
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
ADAPTABILITY
President Roque Saenz Pena promoted an electoral reform in 
1911-12 which called for universal male suffrage, the secret 
ballot, and compulsory voting. In spite of its democratic 
guise, this plan sought to fortify the traditional system. 
Assuming the middle classes were committed to existing 
economic and political structures, cooptation of the Radicals 
appeared to be an appropriate solution to ease the tensions 
in society.
The extension of the franchise brought changes to the
Argentine political system. First, the popular base
expanded. All Argentine males over 18-years-old could vote.
Second, Argentine elections became closely contested events
—  with winners rarely capturing more than 60 percent of the 
47
vote. Expanded participation and the possibilities for
political opposition helped to strengthen the legitimacy
of governmental structures.
Nonetheless, the Saenz Pefia reform only opened up the
political system in a limited way. To vote, Argentine males
still had to be citizens. At the time of its first
application, the electoral law offered voting rights to
48
only 40 or 45 percent of the adult male population. Since 
immigrants made up approximately one-half of the expanding 
middle class and an even greater share of the working class 
(approximately 60 percent in the urban areas), Peter H. Smith 
argues that suffrage extended only "from the upper-class to
43.
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selected segments of the middle-class."
The electoral reform and consequent redistribution of
political strength were meant •—  at least by the
conservatives — * to sustain the longstanding rules of the
50
Argentine political game. As Smith observes, central to 
this arrangement was the idea of a balance of power and 
government by consensus or acuerdo. In spite of the influx 
of new groups, political conflict would retain traditional 
features including:
(1) Fluid patterns of alignment, and in particular 
fluid patterns of party allegiance;
(2) Disregard for class background; and
(3) Continued dependence of the distribution of 
political power upon the distribution of 
economic power.
To many aristocratic conservatives, the maintenance of these 
norms was essential to the legitimacy of the new electoral 
politics. Thus, the inherent inflexibility that was a part 
of the political system demonstrates its lack of adaptability.
COMPLEXITY
Yrigoyen began his tenure as President in 1916 with a
minority in the Chamber of Deputies; only one representative
in the Senate; and provincial control limited to Santa Fe,
52Cordoba, and Entre Rios. The Radicals made slow progress 
outside the coastal cities. In the interior regions elements 
of the population remained insulated from the impact of
7
immigration, urbanism, and the rising middle class. In these 
areas, conservatives continued to dominate the provincial
44.
governments. This powerful influence in the provinces 
assured conservative sovereignty in Congress, especially in
the Senate whose members were chosen by provincial 
53
legislatures.
Yrigoyen's subsequent intervention in the provinces
aroused the ire of many conservative interests. Intervention
is the constitutional method by which the national government
temporarily assumes control of the affairs of any or all of
the provinces. In a state of intervention, the national
government replaces the governing body with an appointive
54
official who boasts complete power. Critics of the
president's policy pointed out that Yrigoyen intervened
in the provinces more often (twenty times) during his first
55
term than had any two previous presidents. These voices of 
dissent argued that the president was attempting to enlarge 
his own power and that of the Radical Party at the cost of 
provincial autonomy.
In the congressional elections of 1918, the U.C.R. gained 
16 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, thereby giving it a 
slight majority in that house. The interventions combined 
with free elections helped the Radicals to gain control of the 
government in the capital, as well as in the provinces of
56
Mendoza, San Juan, La Rioja, Catamarca, and Buenos Aires. 
Despite the movement's success at the polls, Yrigoyen failed 
to amass a majority in the Senate. This lack of support 
endangered the passage of Yrigoyen's legislative reform 
package. In addition to the conservative opposition, the 
president and his movement faced hostility from the
45.
Socialists, who thought the Radical's social program was
insufficiently reformist, and from the Progressive Democrats,
57
who were simply anti-Yrigoyen.
In an effort to gain the support of the emergent working
class, Yrigoyen's labor policy included plans for protective
58
social legislation support by charity and patronage.
Between 1916 and 1919, the president backed several strikes, 
particularly those against the railway and maritime sectors 
which were dominated by foreign capital. This support was 
tantamount to intervention, as the government refused to 
deploy the police to break strikes. On some occasions,
Yrigoyen used the power of the presidency to urge employers 
to comply with the demands of labor.
Middle and upper classes resented what they perceived as 
government capitulation to labor. Consequently, few of the 
government's proposals for reform became law. The Radical's 
failure to implement even modest proposals for industrial 
development or tariff protection embittered the urban lower 
sectors. With the downturn in the economy in 1913 and 
depressed conditions until 1918, the government faced growing 
social unrest. In the city of Buenos Aires, labor strife 
culminated in the January 1919 "Tragic Week," when the
59
government ordered military intervention to restore order.
In many ways Yrigoyen's labor policy proved counter­
productive. It contributed to an upswing in labor activity 
and unionization between 1916 and 1920. But the relationship
7
between the Radical government and labor remained tenuous 
at best, and the protective role of the state failed to become
46.
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institutionalized. By its incapacity to bridge the regional 
and social divisions in society, the Radical government failed
Huntington's test of complexity.
AUTONOMY
The political success of the Radicals depended heavily on
Yrigoyen's personal leadership and a system of local party
bosses and their machine organizations. The Radicals took
over the patronage network that the landowning elite used so
effectively to buy off their opposition. Yrigoyen's political
strategy combined machine politics with populist appeals
61
in an attempt to build a mass movement.
Yrigoyen's personality traits facilitated the process of
mass political organizing. Argentine essayist and social
critic Ezequiel Martinez Estrada wrote of Yrigoyen that he
"embodied (a) transcendental and magic reality in his person,
62
in his mentality and in his acts as apostle and martyr."
This man of mystery with his paternal aloofness was not far
63
removed from the Rosas tradition of oligarchic populism.
In 1922 tensions surfaced over the selection of 
Yrigoyen's successor. These strains subsided when Yrigoyen 
announced that Marco T. de Alvear was his choice. Problems 
reemerged in 1924 when the Party split along social lines into 
two camps: the middle class pro-Yrigoyen personalists and the
patrician pro-Alvear anti-personalists. Analyzing electoral
/
data, Smith finds that, "the higher the Status, the more
64
Antipersonalist (or less Personalist) the stance."
47.
Smith's data point to the relevance of regional conflict
in the Radical Party split. The dispute reflected the
cleavage between Buenos Aires (both city and province),
where Yrigoyen had most thoroughly developed his political
machine, and the rest of the country. This division pitted
the coast against the interior. Yrigoyen's subsequent efforts
to subordinate interior interests to those of the littoral
further antagonized the Party's provincial supporters. In
Mendoza and San Juan, for example, local populist leaders who
had originally supported the Radicals, broke away from the 
65
movement.
It is important to note that for groups organized 
according to class or regional loyalties, the party machine 
was incapable of performing many direct personal services.
What these groups would be likely to be interested in was 
government "policy responsiveness" to their interests rather 
than handouts of jobs and sinecures. Thus, while the machine 
organization proved invaluable for electoral purposes, it 
limited the government's capacity to engage in autonomous 
policy formulation.
LEGITIMACY
The implementation of the Saenz Perla law precipitated 
changes in voting patterns. Instead of the old acuerdo 
system, officials arrived at political decisions in a more
open manner. In particular. Smith points to the increasing
/
number of contested roll calls in the Chamber of Deputies as 
evidence of the decline in the political power-sharing
48.
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arrangement.
After the split between the middle-class Yrigoyen wing
and the upper-class Alvear faction of the Radical Party in
1924, the Yrigoyenist U.C.R. held two-thirds of the seats in
in the lower chamber by 1930. Similarly, in the upper chamber
the Yrigoyenist Radicals made inroads into the power base of
the conservatives. Smith finds that partisan ballots jumped
from low levels before the electoral reform to high and
67
moderate levels after 1916. By 1928, deviations from the
party line manifested themselves only rarely as the
Yrigoyenist U.C.R. formed an effective voting bloc in both
houses of the legislature.
Party conflict assumed an air of social conflict. Upper-
class elements which figured prominently in both the
Radical and the conservative contingents elected to the
lower chamber from 1916 to 1918 decreased significantly
during the 1920s. The break between Yrigoyen and the Alvear
factions virtually eliminated the patrician elements from
the legislature after 1924. By 1928-30, only 19 percent
68
of the U.C.R.'s partisans were from the upper class.
A new generation of Radical Party professionals firmly 
entrenched themselves in influencial positions within the 
bureaucracy. This displacement of the conservative elites 
became a source of major contention. As one contemporary 
observer complained:
/
The Congress was full of rabble and unspeakable 
hoodlums. The parliamentary language used up to 
then had been replaced by the coarse language of 
the outskirts of the city and the Radical's 
committees.6 9
49.
Synonymous with this internal subversion of the political 
system was the remodeling of the patronage mechanism to suit 
middle-class interests.
Just as the parliamentary apparatus fell under the 
control of middle-class interests, Yrigoyen continued to 
extend his personal power through the centralized presidency. 
Receiving almost total compliance from the legislature from 
1926 to 1929, Yrigoyen moved to implement popular programs. 
Difficulties in achieving these reforms encouraged the 
president to resort to more interventions in the provinces 
to enforce order and compliance with his programs. Of 93
such actions from 1862 to 1930, 34 took place during the
70
14-year period of Radical rule. The distribution of 
political power thus became concentrated in the Radical camp.
When Yrigoyen returned to the presidency in 1928, his 
government was thoroughly middle class. Government patronage 
expanded to its limits as Yrigoyen attempted to maintain his 
political support in the midst of an economic decline. Rock
observes that, "By June 1929, it was reported that jobs were
71
being sold on the open market. *' Yrigoyen's attempt to turn
the Army into a source of patronage proved disastrous. Many
officers resented this move to instill partisan loyalties
among the top ranks of the military. In response to the
government's departure from traditional norms and Yrigoyen's
intervention into military affairs, these officers, like the
72
conservatives, lost confidence in the Radical government.
From the mid-1920s to their fall from power, the Radicals 
violated the long-standing rules of the political game.
5 0 .
Partisan politics replaced fluid party allegiances as the 
Radicals became the dominant voice in the decision-making 
process. Through their steady growth in power, the Radicals 
gradually transformed the economic and social bases of 
government. To halt this process, the conservatives had to 
rely on help from the disloyal opposition within the ranks of 
the military.
Yrigoyen's popular appeal was his main source of power 
when the economic crisis of 1929 began. Yet, the inability of 
his government to deal effectively with the crisis excited 
the wrath of the economic elites. In addition, the urban 
middle class turned against the government because its income, 
tied to foreign trade, plummeted. As the crisis deepened, 
public confidence in the government's legitimacy eroded, and 
the Radicals lost the March 1930 legislative elections in 
their former stronghold -- Buenos Aires.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
Two important elements came to view Argentine democracy
as illegitimates conservative civilians and segments of the
military. On August 9, 1930, legislators from the opposition
parties published the "Manifesto of the Forty-four,"
protesting Yrigoyen’s "arbitrary and despotic" rule and
calling for the need to "save Argentina’s democratic
73
institutions and prevent the ruin of the country."
On August 13, military members led by General Josi F.
7
Uriburu made a pledge to overthrow the Yrigoyen government.
At subsequent public rallies for the Manifesto of the Forty-
51.
four, Antipersonalist leaders in Buenos Aires and Entre Rios
urged the population to rise up in alliance against the 
74
government.
As the possibilities for a coup materialized, Yrigoyen
fell ill. His Minister of War, General Luis Dellepiane,
called for the president to take decisive action against the
conspirators. Yet, Yrigoyen failed to respond —  perhaps
because of his illness. Dellepiane quit on September 2.
Two days later, the Dean of the Buenos Aires Law School
asked Yrigoyen to resign for the good of the nation.
Yrigoyen complied that same afternoon, but it was too late
75
to stop the coup.
On September 6, a group of cadets from the Campo de Mayo 
garrison, led by General Jos^ F. Uriburu, marched into the 
capital and easily assumed control. Many groups in society 
greeted the news with satisfaction. The parties called for 
a return to the constitution and for new elections.
Ill. Conclusion
This examination of the interaction of socio-economic 
variables during the period from 1880 to the First World War 
indicates that growing political instability was associated 
with the onset to economic decline after a period of improving 
conditions. Reflecting the frustrations of the emergent 
middle class, the revolts of 1890 and 1893 occurred during 
periods of poor economic performance. This turmoil 
notwithstanding, the economic elites were largely successful 
in their bid to coopt the emergent middle class into the
5 2 .
traditional political system.
However, the mobilization of middle-class groups into 
politics challenged the rigid structure of the system. 
Yrigoyen's government did not uphold the traditional acuerdo 
methods balancing the distribution of power. Instead, 
the president relied on his personal leadership skills to 
organize a popular movement. Yrigoyen's uncompromising 
stance and the machine character of Radicalism militated 
against policy responsiveness on behalf of different groups 
and interests in society. Neglecting to establish any 
coherent rules or structures. Radicalism eventually succumbed 
to a backlash reaction to restore the traditional political 
order.
The Conservatives wanted democracy to uphold the 
traditional rules of the game, but the pursuit of democracy 
led to the violation of those rules. This was the rational 
behind the coup that removed Yrigoyen from power. According 
to the analysis of this study, it appears that the conjunction 
of high participation and low institutionalization increases 
the inclination of disaffected elites to resort to illegal 
power seizures. Perhaps this is because in such situations 
the burdens created by mass mobilization have outrun the 
capabilities of political institutions, and elites see coups 
as alternative means to restore order.
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CHAPTER III 
THE PERONIST PERIOD, 1946-1955
This chapter examines some of the factors behind the 
rise of Peronism. The analysis, which builds on the 
discussion of the Radical period, centers on the role of rapid 
economic and social changes in fostering the growth of this 
popular movement. It focuses on the political behavior which 
contributed to the demise of the Peronist government in 1955.
I. Operational Environment
The conservative successors of the Radical governments
bypassed and manipulated constitutional rules to stay
in power during the 1930s. The coalition of conservatives,
anti-personalist Radicals, and Independent Socialists,
calling itself the Concordancia, placed General Agustin
Justo in the presidency. In the 1931 elections, the
Concordancia captured 63 percent of the seats in the Chamber
1
of Deputies and 87 percent of those in the Senate. The 
newly-formed coalition soon returned to the conventional 
practice of excluding opponents from the initiation and 
formulation of policy.
During the Depression, the collapse of foreign''trade 
forced the authorities to adopt economic measures to
59.
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stimulate industrial growth. The Justo administration's
exchange controls and multiple exchange rates, coupled with
2
higher tariffs, benefitted the industrialists. More important
perhaps than government policies, the growing demand of
Argentine consumers combined with reduced imports increased
the value of Argentine manufacturing by 54 percent between 
3
1935 and 1945.
By the late 1940s light industry had significantly
expanded so that the proportion of GNP generated by
manufacture outstripped that by agriculture and cattle 
4
breeding. (See Table 3.1). Gilbert Merkx provides further
evidence of industry’s growth. Between 1935 and 1939 the
GDP grew by 15 percent, but agriculture's contribution
increased by only 2 percent, while that of industry grew 
5
by 24 percent.
Nevertheless, both the industrial and landowning sectors
were economically intertwined. As Gustavo Polit argues,
the vague boundaries that separated them were attenuated
through the investment of agrarian rent in industry and the
6
investment of industrial profit in agriculture. The
industrialists approved of the latifundia, or the large
estate system, which provided industry with a cheap labor
force of displaced tenant farmers. Describing this situation
in 1943, Torcuato Di Telia pointed out:
Much has been said about the idyllic life in the 
country. But what is actually seen of it in our 
wide territory does not agree with what is said 
about it; the farmer leaves the farm at the fiirst 
opportunity and heads for the urban centers, 
in spite of the city's unhealthy housing 
conditions, promiscuity, and insecurity of 
daily work. »
TABLE 3.1
PROPORTION OF GNP GENERATED BY MANUFACTURE AND 
BY AGRICULTURE AND CATTLE BREEDING, 1930-1954
YEARS MANUFACTURE
AGRICULTURE 
AND CATTLE 
BREEDING
(PERCENT OF GNP)
1930 18.6 21.4
1935 19.3 27.5
1940 20.6 24.5
1945 22.8 20.1
1950 23.4 15.5
1954 22.1 17.2
Source: Gino Germani, "Social Modernization and Economic
Development in Argentina," Report prepared for 
the United Nations Research Institute/ for Social 
Development, 1970, p. 63.
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Thus, the symbiosis between industrialists and land holders 
worked to the disadvantage of the provincial lower class.
SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
The influx of immigrants, which had continued for half
a century, declined sharply in the 1930s, partly because
Argentina was no longer the land of opportunity and partly
because the government restricted immigration. As
immigration declined, migration from the rural interior
contributed to urbanization. Although there is no census
data between 1914 and 1947, Gino Germani asserts that growing
internal migration, beginning in the mid-1930s, coincided
with the shift from agriculture, the great jump in the demand
8
for industrial labor, and the end of overseas immigration.
By 1936 approximately 83,000 domestic migrants arrived
annually in the greater Buenos Aires area. During the
following decade, this total increased to more than 96,000
9
annual arrivals. Germani estimates that, from 1936 to 1947,
internal migrants to the Buenos Aires area surged from
400,000 to 1.5 million. Most migrants who travelled to the
urban centers were from the less developed regions of the
interior. The previous experience of these individuals
reflected a rural, non-industrial life style. Thus, the great
migration fused immigrant and creole Argentina; it linked the
littoral with the interior.
This transformation and displacement affected jthe entire
/
country. Table 3.2 indicates that these newcomers began to 
rival the foreign-born population in the principal urban
TABLE 3.2
POPULATION OF THE BUENOS AIRES 
METROPOLITAN AREA INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
SOURCE OF ITS COMPOSITION (1869-1957)
YEAR
TOTAL
POPULATION
% BORN 
ABROAD
% BORN 
INTERIOR
AV. ANNUAL 
NO. MIGRANTS 
FROM INTERIOR
1869 250,000 47 3
1895 783,000 50 8 8,000
1914 2,035,000 49 11
1936 3,430,000 36 12 83,000
1947 4,720,000 26 29
1957 6,370,000 22 36
96,000
Source: Gino Germani, "Transformation of the Social and
Political Structure," Why Perdn Came to Power:
The Background to Peronism in Argentina
ed. Joseph R. Barager (New York: Alfred A . Knopf,
1968), p. 124.
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areas. Gino Germani finds that, "In 1947 between one-half
and 70 percent of the [preexisting urban workers] had been
10
replaced by new workers in the Buenos Aires area." Economic
change measured by industrial growth thus served to alter
radically the social and political landscape. In his analysis
of Peronist electoral support, Lars Schoultz finds that areas
undergoing industrial change tended to have a rapidly growing
population, working class in social composition, that
exhibited relatively little economic satisfaction. His
statistical findings indicate that the size of an area's
working-class population and its rate of industrial growth
explain a large percentage (84 percent) of the vote for 
11
Peronism.
ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION
An examination of the wage share of national income
reveals why many Argentines experienced economic
dissatisfaction. Table 3.3 presents some measures of the
share of wages in the national income. Column (1) shows the
wage and salary share of national income if capital
consumption allowances are estimated at original cost.
Column (2) displays the wage and salary share of national
income if capital consumption allowances are estimated at
replacement cost. The trend is the same in both cases.
Column (1) indicates that the wage share remained within the
12
43 to 47 percent range from 1935 to 1947. ^
While the wage share of national income remained 
relatively constant during these years, the number of people
TABLE 3.3 
WAGE SHARE OF NET DOMESTIC INCOME
YEAR (1) (2)
1935 46.8 46.1
1936 46.9 46.0
1937 44.4 43.9
1938 46.6 46.2
1939 46.3 46.3
1940 46.0 46.4
1941 45.3 45.7
1942 43.1 43.5
1943 44.1 44.4
1944 44.8 45.2
1945 45.9 46.7
1946 45.2 46.8
1947 46.6 47.9
(1)
Capital consumption allowances estimated at original 
cost.
(2)
Capital consumption allowances estimated at replacement 
cost.
h
Source: Clarence Zuvekas, Jr., "Economic Growth and Income
Distribution In Postwar Argentina,M Inter-American 
Economic Affairs 20 (Winter 1966): 25.
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employed in industrial-related activities exploded.
Table 3.4 reveals that the number of employees and workers
in industry increased 130 percent between 1935 and 1946.
During these years the total industrial labor force rose
12 percent annually. Table 3.5 indicates that by 1946 there
were over one million persons working in industry,
concentrated in the Buenos Aires area. This industrial
labor force accounted for more than 17 percent of the
economically-active population.
The leaders of the nation's dominant labor organization,
the Confederacies General del Trabajo (CGT), protested the
government's disregard for labor's problems. These
complaints grew louder as real wages leveled off and
unemployment increased. Real wages for industrial workers
-- which doubled during the 1920s —  remained about the
same throughout the 1930s, declining somewhat after 1935.
By 1933 approximately 334,000 workers, or 7 percent of the
13
work force, were unemployed. These economic problems 
underlay the mounting social frustration.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
The industrial working class, which approached one-fifth 
of the economically-active population at the outbreak of the 
Second World War, could no longer be overlooked. This 
unorganized group represented a potentially powerful political
bloc, as native Argentine workers entered an expanding pool of
a
eligible voters. Yet, they had virtually no political 
representation. For example, only the Socialists stood up for
67.
TABLE 3.4
GROWTH OF THE INDUSTRIAL LABOR FORCE, 1935-1946
GROUP 1935 1943 1946
% INC. ANNUAL 
35-46 % INC.
Employees 49,295 87,778 135,484 176 16
Workers 418,020 756,222 938,387 124 11
Total 
Industrial 
Labor Force
467,315 844,000 1,073,870 130 12
TABLE 3.5
RELATIVE SIZE OF THE INDUSTRIAL LABOR FORCE: 1895-1946
YEAR
INDUSTRIAL
LABOR
FORCE
ECON.
ACTIVE
POP.
I.L.F.
AS % 
E.A.P.
1895 118, 835 1,601,826 7
1914 389, 716 3,119,148 12
1946 1,073, 871 6,267,313 17
Sources Gilbert Wilson Merkx, "Political and Economic
Change in Argentina from 1870 to 1966," (mimeog. 
Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1968), p. 191.
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working-class interests in the Chamber of Deputies, but they
were far too small a group to gain significant support for 
14
legislation. Thus, before Per<5n's rise to power, attempts 
by leaders of the urban lower class to promote urban mass 
interests were continually frustrated by the established 
constitutional institutions and procedures.
The Conservative rulers' traditional practices discredited 
party politics and constitutional government in the eyes of 
many Argentines. In particular, the military lost confidence 
in the ability of the politicians to maintain stable political 
order. When President Ramon Castillo attempted to secure 
military support behind Robustiano Patr<5n Costas (President 
of the Senate and leader of the Conservatives), as his 
successor in 1943, several key officers resisted. The 
movement against Castillo expanded in 1943 as economic 
growth came to a standstill. Finally, on the morning of 
June 4, troops under the command of General Arturo Rawson 
moved through Buenos Aires toward the Casa Rosada. The 
ensuing fall of Castillo meant the end to the Conservative 
restoration in Argentine politics.
Colonel Juan Domingo Per6n did not lead the coup, but he 
was an active participant in it as a member of a nationalist, 
pro-Axis faction of young officers. He immediately set out 
to establish a place for himself in the new regime. Through 
his contacts with the elite, Per<£n received a post as head of
the Department of Labor and Social Security. From, this
/
position he organized thousands of workers and built a loyal 
following by rewarding unions that supported him with
favorable collective bargaining settlements and social
security benefits while punishing those who refused to accept
15
his leadership. After years of receiving poor service from 
socialist and anarchist leaders who could not secure better 
wages and social services, Argentine laborers quickly fell in 
step with Per&i's juggernaut.
Per<3n's status as the spokesman for labor produced 
distrust among his rivals in the government. On October 9, 
1945, a group of officers led by General Avalos forced the 
government to oust Peron. His subsequent arrest and exile to 
Martin Garcia Island in the Plate estuary was greeted with 
unprecedented public outcry. In fear of an uprising, the 
government called back Perc5n to control the situation.
In his triumphant return, Peron resigned his commission 
and announced his candidacy for the presidency. His victory 
in the 1946 elections with 54 percent of the popular vote and 
Peronist majorities in both houses of Congress represented a 
mandate•
II. Institutional Environment
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Peron's government immediately concerned itself with 
satisfying the workers' demand for dignity and equal status 
in Argentine society. He proclaimed that the workers were the 
essence of the new Argentine nation and that his
ft
administration represented a government of the masses.
He defined the new regime to be one with a profoundly 
proletariat and worker base where the acts of government would
7 0 .
16
be inspired by the masses.
The workers' support for Per<5n came from a perception
of their interests rather than simply from their admiration
of his special leadership style. For instance, Per6n
initiated new campaigns to increase the workers 1 feeling of
dignity, equal status, and communal identity. This drive
led to the incorporation of labor's rights into the
Constitution of 1949. Article 37 of the Constitution
17
specifically enumerated the rights of the worker. Labor's
response was overwhelmingly favorable. As Samuel Baily notes,
"Because of Per<5n, the law and the government finally
guaranteed the workers a meaningful identity as part of 
18
society." In satisfying some of the economic and social 
needs of all sectors of the labor movement, Peron's political 
changes brought the workers increasingly under the influence 
of the state.
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
ADAPTABILITY
An adjustment in the political order did not accompany 
the rapid changes which occurred during Argentina's economic 
modernization in the years before World War II. Instead, the 
severe conditions under which the political system functioned 
after 1930 inhibited its ability to absorb new levels of
participation. The attempt to reestablish a "limited
/
democracy" based on power-sharing between the conservative 
elites added new rigidities precisely at the moment when
71.
maximum flexibility was required.
In order to accomodate the recently mobilized groups
within the political system, Gino Germani argues that either
the existing political parties had to be altered or a new one
had to be created. In practice Argentine political parties
offerred no outlet for the needs of urban labor. As Germani
observes s
The political elite was unable to understand the 
economic and social changes that were occurring 
so rapidly and the Socialist Party, especially, 
as well as the unions, did not effectively take 
advantage of the political potential offered by 
the new industrial workers. '
Thus, the political system's lack of adaptability indirectly
contributed to the rise of Juan Peron.
COMPLEXITY
PercSn's charismatic appeal helped to build a populist 
coalition composed of three main groups:
(1) The original (anti-status quo) elite,
• • • drawn from the marginal industrialists,
Radical Right intellectuals, traditional 
Church groups, and armed forces with a 
Falangista inclination.
(2) The new masses, made up mostly of the recent 
arrivals from the countryside and those lower 
sectors of the urban working class that had never 
been organized before, but also comprising many 
old trade unionists who joined the coalition once 
its populist character was apparent.
(3) Some of the impoverished middle classes from 
the interior of the country, who had been excluded 
by the previous oligarchic system. Many of them 
were represented by old Radical Party leaders, 
and some Conservative caudillos who joined forces
with Per6n.20 b
The Peronist multi-class coalition thus shifted the balance
7 2 .
of electoral power in Argentina. Peron's initial power- 
sharing arrangement called for the creation of a corporate
state organizing society according to functional groups. As
the chief mediator of political conflicts, the state would
also ensure social harmony.
According to Eldon Kenworthy, to rule in Argentina during
the late 1940s required something like the coalition that
Peron forged. Kenworthy further asserts that keeping
such a coalition together required the economic policies
21
that Peron adopted. Per£n's economic approach relied on
some of the same techniques that the industrial countries in
Europe and North America had employed in their post-depression
recoveries. Argentina's economic decision-makers hoped that
deficit spending would restore prosperity. This strategy
relied on developing import-substitution industries while
simultaneously stimulating demand for the items produced
internally. Central to this plan was the redistribution of
income and power from rural producers to urban consumers and
industrialists through fiscal, price, wage, and credit 
22
measures•
As Argentina's external position worsened, especially
after the droughts of 1950 and 1951, the protected industries
could no longer be propped up with profits from the export
sector. In announcing the Emergency Economic Plan of 1952,
Peron asked the industrialists for patience while the
government restored the country's capacity to import fuels and 
23 f
raw materials. Per6n succeeded by 1953 in restoring a
positive payments balance and an increase in the gross
73.
national product. But this period also witnessed an
acceleration in the decapitalization of the private sector and
growing uncertainty which sapped entrepreneurial confidence.
Although production increased impressively, it still fell 50
24percent below the record levels of the war years. Peron's
economic measures proved insufficient for maintaining the
support of Argentine industrialists.
The leaders of the rural sector were among the first to
denounce Peron*s policies. The cattlemen of the Rural Society
and the Confederation of Rural Associations of Buenos Aires
and La Pampa (CARBAP) protested their sudden eviction from
the agricultural policy-making process as well as their loss
of income through controlled prices. Tenant farmers, on the
other hand, supported Peronist legislation which extended the
rent controls adopted by the military government in 1943 for
another five years, with a three-year renewal option. Still,
Peronist reforms eventually led to complaints from both the
landowners and the tenant farmers because commodity price
control measures hurt large and small farmers alike,
25
especially after 1948.
(
This loss of upper-middle-class support impaired the
Peronist coalition's ability to mobilize the masses in the
interior. These unorganized groups returned to supporting
local Conservative or Radical caudillos. With the widening
rift developing between the city and the countryside, Per<5n's
coalition lost its other non-working-class sectors the
26 h
provincial middle-class. With support declining from the
other two legs of the populist triad, the complexity of
74.
Peron's government decreased significantly. Thus, Peron was 
forced to rely on the continued loyalty of organized labor.
AUTONOMY
Personalism was the cement that held Peronism together
between 1946 and 1955. From 1946 to 1948, ideological
conflict was rife within Peronist ranks between the
autonomously-inclined unionists and a variety of opportunist
and nationalist factions. The mounting discord provided Peron
with a convenient rationale for centralizing the party under
his personal control. On May 23, 1946, Peron declared the
electoral coalition dissolved. His call to unity meant the
end of previously independent parties and factions, assuring
the defection of prominent political leaders to the Peronist
camp. He then ordered the formation of a new group, the
27
Parti do Unico de la Revoluci<5n.
The organization of a single party began in January
1947. The new Partido Peronista remained divided. Two
areas of controversy persisted: the competition among
various local interests; and the struggle between Peronists
28
and those favoring union autonomy. Walter Little stresses 
the importance of the latter schism between the unions and the 
politicians. Per£n frowned on the unions, which continued to 
demand the right to participate equally and directly in party 
affairs. In the Peronist political organization, there was
no room for alternative sources of power. /
/
Per6n demanded that independent labor groups subordinate 
themselves to his state-run political organization. Under
75.
this pressure, the independent labor list finished a 
distant second in the December 1947 elections with 3,591
votes compared to the first-place finish of the official list
29
with 14,591 votes. Support for union autonomy virtually
30
disappeared by the end of the following year. The eclipse of 
internal opposition led the party to reorganize along strict 
Peronist lines.
It appeared that nothing was beyond Peron's grasp. In 
his attempt to revise the Constitution of 1853, Peron 
flaunted his power after winning clear control of the
constitutional convention of 1948 (the Peronist Party elected
31
109 delegates while the U.C.R. won only 48 delegates). The
convention amended 53 articles of the Constitution, repealed
32
nine articles as obsolete, and added six new articles.
An important clause against presidential succession was one 
of the articles repealed, thereby allowing Peron to remain in 
power. Through these measures, Peron became the dominant 
political force in the country.
Walter Little argues that, given this accumulation of 
power, subsequent developments involving the party can best be 
understood in terms of Peron's personal vision. Because of 
his distrust of the common people, Peron insisted on rigorous 
codes of unity and discipline to increase the effectiveness 
of the party's organization. Peron sought to mold public 
attitudes in keeping with the doctrina nacional or 
Justicialism. Pursuant to this ideology, the Peropist Party 
would guide the country toward a political position lying 
somewhere between capitalism and socialism.
76.
Per<£n's autocratic leadership style eventually undermined 
the prestige and autonomy of the Peronist Party. The
Peronists' unwillingness to compromise with the other
interests in society nullified their initial popular appeal.
As Little observes:
The Peronists sought a revolution in political 
culture without any serious changes in structure, 
and this contradiction accounts for their failure 
to transcend personalism and create and effective 
party.
Perc5n attempted to retain personal power by strengthening
his Partido Peronista. In place of the traditional political
institutions, the party was to become the sole source of
political authority. Nevertheless, Walter Little concludes
that one of the most important characteristics of the Peronist
34
movement was its lack of an effective political party. 
Likewise, the personalism in the political organization of 
Peronism undermined the autonomy of national political 
institutions.
LEGITIMACY
Peronist policies led not to harmony, but to increased 
political conflict. Per6n's design for a corporate society 
allowed few opportunities for the expression of dissent. The 
Chamber of Deputies became the scene of intense partisan 
rivalry as the Peronist delegates used roll-call votes to 
demonstrate their solidarity and to intimidate the opposition.
The effort of Radicals to resist the Peronist onslaught at
h
times appeared futile. For example, in April 1953, the pro­
government deputies temporarily expelled opposition elements
77.
from the chamber. Not surprisingly, Congress remained 
consistently compliant to the demands of the executive, as the
Peronist deputies acted with near-unanimity on most issues.
With the ineffectiveness of the mechanisms of political
opposition, open confrontations erupted between social
groups, especially after the onset of economic decline in
the early 1950s. The upper and middle classes mobilized
against the government's favoritism toward labor interests.
In this environment of mounting social tensions, Per6n
tried to demonstrate his political strength. First, he
consolidated his control over the armed forces. A majority of
Peronists in Congress empowered him to promote, demote, or
retire officers at will. Second, an act of Congress
authorized him to create a new martial law, referred to as the
"state of internal war," which called for the death penalty to
35
deter rebel activity.
The Church was one of the first groups to disassociate 
itself from the regime. Demonstrating its independence, it 
began training labor leaders outside the officially sanctioned 
Peronist institutions. In December 1954 Per<Sn responded with 
a congressional act that made divorce legal for the first 
time in Argentina? in May 1955, the government removed 
religious instruction from the schools. The Church reacted 
with mass demonstrations against the government. Per6n 
retaliated by expelling two of the organizing priests from 
the country. Within days of this action, the Vatican 
excommunicated those involved in ordering the expulsions, 
including Per<Sn and his cabinet.
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Elements of the armed forces bristled under Peron's 
requirement that they take an oath of loyalty to the
constitutionally-sanctioned national doctrine. This
perceived insult was made worse when Peron required them
to receive instruction in the doctrine. The armed forces
felt threatened by these challenges to its professional
autonomy. Some accounts suggest that the cause of the
revolt of June 1955 may have been connected to an order
making the study of the doctrine obligatory in the Navy, the
36
service least loyal to the regime. These instances of 
opposition to Peronist political prescriptions culminated in 
a crisis of legitimacy for Peronism.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
At 12:45 p.m. on June 16, 1955, Navy planes attacked
the Casa Rosada. and Marine troops advanced on the capital.
Civilian conspirators seized a radio station and proclaimed
37
a "democratic revolution." Despite these events, the Army 
remained loyal to Per^n and put down the revolt. In the 
aftermath, Peron began an erratic course marked by indecision 
and actions that alienated supporters in the unions and the 
Armed Forces.
Among the officers who subsequently rebelled, some, like 
General Eduardo Lonardi, were right-wing Catholics who worked 
closely with a civilian conspiratorial group of Catholic-
nationalists led by Mario Amadeo. Two other groups of
//
officers —  conservative democrats led by General Pedro 
Aramburu and liberal democrats led by Admiral Isaac Rojas —
79.
. . 38joined the Lonardi-Amadeo group m  opposition.
The resistance also included middle and upper-middle-
class elements —  a liberal opposition formed partly in
reaction to Peron's repression of the universities and the
Church. The U.C.R. became the principal voice of the
alienated civilian elements calling for Pertin's resignation.
The U.C.R.'s support for the military coup made the
difference between a rerun of the abortive effort of June 1955
and the successful action in September.
On September 16, 1955, the Cordoba Army garrison, most
of the Navy, and segments of the Air Force revolted. Army
units from Buenos Aires moved to quell the rebellion, and
they succeeded in retaking most of Cordoba within 24 hours.
The rebels, however, held on for two more days. During this
period, other small garrisons joined the rebellion. Threats
mounted against the regime as the fleet, after shelling
Mar de Plata, set sail for Buenos Aires.
Although Peron's position was strong —  he still had the
support of a major part of the Army and the labor movement
and the acquiescence of the general population —  he gave in
to mounting pressure. On September 19 he turned the
presidency over to a group of loyalist generals. Boarding a
Paraguayan gunboat, Peron made a temporary exit from
Argentine politics.
Ill. Conclusion
/
/
The economic expansion and industrialization between 
1935 and 1946 spurred a major internal migration in
80.
Argentina. Policies increasing consumption, expanding 
employment of the urban working class, and broadening
possibilities for upward mobility initially provided adequate
channels for offsetting the strains of rapid social
mobilization. Nevertheless, lack of improvement in real wages
and in political representation for the urban workers under
Conservative administrations during the 1930s contributed to
new demands on government.
The rigidity of the political system to working class
needs stimulated the growth of the Peronist movement.
Between 1946 and 1949, Perc^ n utilized his personal popularity
and the powers of the presidency to consolidate his control
over the political system. However, the personalism inherent
in the operation of Peronism discouraged the formation of
working relationships between different socio-economic
interests. The subordination of party and state structures
to the loose organization of Peronism failed to produce a more
durable system of government. Peron never gave his rules and
practices the firm institutional foundation needed to sustain
them.
Peronism opened up the political process to many who 
had been disenfranchised in the past. Yet, this movement 
failed to produce strong new structures to regulate political 
conduct. Per<Sn's use of personal authority in an attempt to 
regulate the behavior of all the other interests proved
destabilizing in the longrun. Hence, the Peronist experience
//
provides evidence to support Huntington's notion of the 
destructive capabilities of political decay.
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CHAPTER IV 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ALFONSIN
According to Samuel P. Huntington, revolution is most 
likely to occur in societies which have experienced some 
social and economic development and where, "the processes of 
political modernization and political development have
1
lagged behind the processes of social and economic change."
During the Radical and Per<Sn periods, Argentine society
underwent two incomplete revolutions. In both cases, an
explosion of political participation occurred. Yet, in both
periods a second phase was missing: the creation and
institutionalization of a new political order. As Eldon
Kenworthy remarks, "Were Samuel Huntington analyzing
Argentina, he would say that the political system was
2
definitely modern, yet imperfectly developed."
I. Institutionalization of the Reformist Alternative 
ADAPTABILITY
The victory of RatSl Alfonsfn in the 1983 elections 
signalled a movement away from Argentina's authoritarian 
politics. Three processes were apparent during thfe popular 
mobilization of the 1983 electoral campaign. First,
85.
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polarization of support occurred between the two major 
parties. Second, the Radicals made significant advances with
their mass rallies in the federal capital and in the principal
cities. Alfonsin, himself, played an important role with his
anti-dictatorial and often anti-militarist stance. The third,
related process was the decline in support for the Peronists.
For the first time in the 40-year history of the movement,
the Argentine people as well as the industrial working-class
3
voted against Peronism. October 1983 ushered in a new era.
Alfonsin won by a margin of 52 percent of the popular
vote to 40 percent for the Peronist candidate, former Senate
president Italo A. Luder. Alfonsin won 57 percent of the
votes in the electoral college, and the Radicals won a clear
majority in the Chamber of Deputies, capturing 129 of the 254
4
seats. The Peronists won 111 seats.
Yet, while the opportunity for establishing stable 
constitutional government has never been better, the 
problems facing the administration are very severe. In 
addition to a $43 billion foreign debt, Alfonsin must handle 
increased union protests fueled by the depressed economy 
and popular demands for justice concerning the crimes 
committed by past military leaders. The fate of Alfonsin*s 
experiment with democracy will depend much on his ability to 
control the labor movement and the Army in the context of 
economic decline.
In a country that once chose between movements,and the
7
military, these changes represent a shift toward greater 
system adaptability. The election was a rejection of extremes
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and suggests that the political system may be stabilizing 
around two major parties. The politics of national
reconciliation currently replace the antiquated Peronist/
anti-Peronist dialogue.
COMPLEXITY
In his drive to reestablish political democracy in 
Argentina, Alfonsin must further open the policy-making 
process to permit competitors to influence decisions. This 
is especially important with regard to economic policy­
making. The competitors are more likely to accept policy
5
decisions achieved through a process of mutual accomodation. 
Institutionalizing competitive pluralism within the policy­
making arena is essential to expanding the political system's 
support.
Ironically, Alfonsin's goals of modernizing the country's
industrial base by attracting foreign investment and by
turning public companies over to the private sector run up
against a general distrust of the state as a vehicle for
economic planning. The tradition of using state authority for
narrow partisan purposes complicates effective management of
the nation's economy. Gary W. Wynia perceptively argues that
the failure of past governments to overcome this widespread
mistrust was due to the apparent contradiction between:
The desire (of Argentina's presidents) to create 
an independent state capable of arbitrating economic 
conflicts, on the one hand, and a need to dictate 
economic policies with highly partisan effects/ on 
the other. ®
Alfonsin must work to end perceptions of the state
8 8 .
as a purely partisan instrument. Instead of simply adopting 
the role of dedicated enforcer of unpopular policies,
Alfonsin must assume the more controversial role of arbitrator
between the conflicting classes and sectors in society.
Crucial to the success of Alfonsin*s chosen management
style is the creation of what Wynia terms:
Linkages between policy makers, administrators, 
and the owners of land, labor, and capital that 
will enable the first two to lead the last in the 
pursuit of societal goals. *7
The continued failure of Argentine leaders to win the
cooperation of the private sector in the implementation
of their economic programs reflected structures which
inhibited dialogue between policymakers and their
constituents.
Alfonsin is making progress in his relations
with agricultural and business groups. According to one
prominent businessman, "Every four months or so we go to see
Alfonsin . . . he is very pluralistic. This is how he has
8
gained the good will of so many of us." These efforts to 
foster good relations between the country's entrepreneurs and 
public officials may expand the government's capacity to 
achieve its policy objectives. Yet, this dialogue must 
extend beyond mere personal relationships to allow structural 
access to decisionmakers.
Alfonsin's administration also needs the support of 
organized labor; this will be a major challenge. With the 
death of Juan Peron on July 1, 1974, and the self-^xile of 
the third Mrs. Per^n on July 6, 1981, the Peronist Party 
lacked leadership to mediate between its many factions.
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The union leaders assumed de facto leadership positions 
of the Peronist Party following the 1983 primary elections.
Despite losing the gubernatorial race, Herminio Iglesias,
a trade union politician, controls the Peronist vote in
the Buenos Aires province. Lorenzo Miguel, head of the
powerful metalworkers union and chief of the "62
Organizations," the political arm of the General Confederation
of Labor, won internal elections to become party first vice
president. The title, however, is misleading. He runs the
party in the absence of Isabel Per^n, who remains the party's
9
elected president.
In his initial relations with the union structure,
Alfonsin set out to limit the autonomy of the powerful
labor hierarchy. As he stated in one interview, "Without
democracy in the unions there cannot be democracy in the 
lO
country." Alfonsm's bill to democratize the unions required 
court-controlled elections of union officers and 
representation of the losing factions on union boards.
In reaction to the proposed legislation, the Peronist- 
dominated Senate rallied in March 1984 to defeat the bill. 
Three independent ballots supported the Peronists, 
demonstrating the continuing strength of the union bosses.
This failure convinced Alfonsfn to adopt a more 
conciliatory approach. In April 1984, he dismissed Labor 
Minister Antonio Mucci, who had antagonized unionists by
intervening in the affairs of two major unions. Opting for
n
negotiation rather than confrontation, Alfonsin renewed his 
calls for national unity. "Without reconciliation and
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dialogue,” he cautioned Congress, "the tendencies to
11
fragmentation could appear and grow."
While the Peronist bureaucracy within the labor movement
will try to maintain its position by pummeling the
government with extravagant economic demands, Alfonsin must
work to keep this sector at the bargaining table. Yet, in
view of the strong Peronist loyalties and the unpredictable
economic conditions in Argentina, Alfonsin will have great
difficulty in accomplishing this task. Nevertheless, it is
essential that government authorities establish an acceptable
forum for dialogue with the labor movement. To promote such a
dialogue, Alfonsin*s government has currently called together
employers, political and union representatives, and
specialists to discuss a new system of labor relations. The
government plans to submit the conclusions of this discussion
to Congress so it can determine the scope and the final
12
content of the reform.
By excluding their political adversaries from
the decision-making process, past governments succeeded only
in provoking the kind of disobedience that threatened policy
implementation and undermined nation cohesion. By setting up
and maintaining a more complex "environment of choice," in
which economic problems can be identified, alternative courses
of action evaluated, and appropriate measures implemented in
an open manner, Alfonsin will be better able to manage the
13
strains which inevitably accompany economic fluctuations.
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AUTONOMY
During his first two years in office, Alfonsin has
responded quickly and decisively to challenges to the fragile
democratic order. As New York Times correspondent Lydia
Chavez points outs
Many times during his first two years Mr.
Alfonsin*s dreams have confronted an 
inhospitable reality. At times his 
response has been belated, confused or 
even reactionary, reaching back to the 
legal traditions of despots. It has 
never been weak. 14
In response to public outrage following the humiliating
defeat in the South Atlantic War and revelations of military
atrocities committed during Argentina's internal "dirty war"
against urban guerrillas, Alfonsin purged the top ranks of the
armed forces. Less than one month after taking office, he
removed one-half of the Army generals. Similarly, he retired
elements of the Air Force and the Navy. In the subsequent
budget-cutting process, he reduced military expenditures from
6 percent of the gross national product to less than 4
percent. He terminated the armed forces' 50-year control
over Fabricaciones Militares, ("a military-industrial
complex that produces everything from plowshares to bullets
and has been a nexus for coup-prone industrial and union 
15
leaders").
In contrast to previous civilian administrations,
Alfonsin's government prosecuted the military elites for
spreading "terror, pain and death throughout Argentine 
16
society." True to an election pledge, Alfonsin voided an 
amnesty law granting armed forces personnel immunity from
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punishment for acts committed during the "dirty war." The 
government then put on trial for mass murder nine prominent
members of the first three military juntas which ruled after
1976. The government also arrested retired Army chief and
former president, General Leopoldo Galtieri, along with the
chiefs of the other two services, for their roles in the South
Atlantic War.
Human rights groups complained that the government was not 
doing enough to bring the armed forces to justice. By the 
summer of 1984, the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights and 
other groups, including the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo 
and the Center for Legal and Social Studies, had filed over 50 
individual cases against military men in relation to
17
disappearances which occurred during the "dirty war." In
pressing their cause, Luis Lorenzano and Alejandro Dabat of
the Argentine Human Rights Coordinating Committee argue:
Since no serious attempt will be made to uproot 
the terrorist structures within the top and middle 
echelons of the three armed forces, a crucial role 
will be played by the human rights organizations 
and the working-class and popular movement. However 
much it may be accused of destabilizing the situation, 
the latter will have to stick to its demands and go 
well beyond the actions of the government.
Although Alfonsin was a human rights advocate during
the days of repression, as President, he and his advisors
must worry that extended court inquiries into individual
officer's responsibility could undermine the military as an
institution. By allowing the military courts to handle these
cases, the government argues that the possibility 6f a
civilian-led witch hunt is checked. Moreover, Alfonsin's
military reforms have removed civilians from the jurisdiction
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of military tribunals and have made armed forces personnel
19
liable for prosecution in civilian courts for common crimes.
Alfonsin's position reflects the dilemma of responding to
popular demands while protecting the autonomy of institutions.
As he points outs
We have to realize that to make the country we 
want, we have to count on the military . . . What 
we have to put an end to are the differences that
make no sense* 20
When the public trials of the nine former military rulers
ended in October 1985, Buenos Aires became the site of
numerous bomb threats and explosions. President Alfonsxn
promptly arrested six officers and six civilians. When legal
complications threatened to thwart the president's actions,
he declared a state of siege to keep the suspects in
custody. His forceful action effectively eliminated the
frequent bombing incidents.
Nevertheless, an ailing economy threatens the government's
efforts at national reconciliation. Since 1960 Argentina has
had only two years of less than double-digit inflation. The
idea that runaway inflation can coexist with prosperity and
political stability is a carry over from the first Peronist
administration. The notion that governments can stimulate
expansion by spending has resulted in inefficient investment
and huge inflation-producing government deficits. High rates
of inflation indicate a breakdown of effective government.
As Robert J. Samuelson puts it, "Instead of making choices,
21 / the government prints money." f
As his first step against inflation, Alfonsin announced
on June 14, 1885, a wage-price freeze that is to stay in
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effect until society and its institutions are convinced that 
inflation will not return. In addition, he promised to
22
limit monetary expansion and to cut the federal deficit.
The government's economic reforms also called for a reduced
role of the state in industry. In direct opposition to some
in his own party, Alfonsin argues that such steps are
necessary because the private sector is more efficient than
the state in handling most forms of enterprise. The Alfonsin
government, by holding down inflation and reducing the role of
the state in the economy, hopes to restore investment and
promote economic growth.
Alfonsin initially succeeded in gaining broad public
support for his economic policies. But the unions resisted.
Real wages declined over 30 percent, and the labor movement
attacked what it considered the government's lack of attention
23
to social welfare concerns. Although the powerful union 
leaders criticized Alfonsin's program, demonstrable progress 
was being made. Inflation fell to about 2 percent a month at 
the close of 1985, prompting favorable predictions for the 
current year. The traditional Peronist leaders received 
little popular support in the 1985 by-elections.
Under Alfonsin's direction, the government has managed to 
mobilize popular support behind military reforms and neo­
orthodox development policies. Through consensus-building
measures, Alfonsin has "tamed" the aspirations of many 
24
Argentines. His drive for the decentralization of political, 
economic, and social power has helped to restore much needed 
autonomy to national political institutions.
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LEGITIMACY
Argentina's chronic political instability is in part a 
product of recurring crises of legitimacy. These crises 
took place as groups in power pursued their own interests with 
little regard for the interests of the nation. As 
participation expanded, Argentine political conflict polarized 
around two opposing sets of interests —  conservative and 
populist. The classically liberal forces of traditionalism 
faced a challenge from the populist forces represented by 
Yrigoyen's Radicals and the Peronists. With increases in 
participation, the pendulum of power shifted toward the 
populists; with the rising exclusiveness of the regimes that 
followed, however, the pendulum swung back toward the 
conservatives.
Robert A. Dahl's typology classifying participation and
public competition as independent dimensions of political
conflict is useful for understanding Argentina's political 
25
dilemma. In Argentine politics, these two dimensions tended 
to exist independently of each other, not only historically, 
but also as beliefs.
In power, the Radicals and the Peronists after them 
attempted to alter the rules of the political game by 
emphasizing increased participation at the expense of 
opportunities for effective opposition. During the latter
half of the 1920s, the Radicals benefitted greatly from the
/
increase in the middle class around the turn of th£ century. 
The Peronists similarly maintained their grip on power by 
mobilizing the support of the newly-enfranchised working
96.
class. As participation levels peaked during both periods of 
populist rule, political oppositions were increasingly
suppressed.
Alfonsin's interest in further liberalizing the political 
system necessarily entails the creation of an arrangement 
which balances mass participation with opportunities for 
effective opposition. The task is to convince Peronists and 
anti-Peronists alike to abide by the rules and to work 
through the institutions of political democracy. The 
acceptance of free and fair elections as a basic norm in 
Argentine politics is a necessary first step toward increased 
stability.
One useful way of determining the legitimacy of the new
system is to observe the succession process. As elections
approach, Alfonsin too must demonstrate his willingness to
abide by their results. This is a particularly critical step
toward institutionalizing the system of government, since:
. • • individuals within the system are forced to 
decide whether their loyalties are confined to 
those who, up to that point, have exercised -
authority or to the system of government itself. °
The results of the November 1985 off-year elections indicated
that a new political outlook is gaining acceptance in
Argentina. Although Alfonsin polled favorable ratings of
73 percent, his Radical Party won only 43 percent of the vote
in the elections. In the past, such a popular leader would
have insured his party a sweep. However, as Lydia Chavez
points out: 7
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• . • Argentines showed restraint. They rejected 
making Mr. Alfonsin the leader of a new movement, 
as many had predicted, and insteacLspread their 
votes among the different parties. '
A test of the system will take place when Alfonsin
must transfer power to another leader. This problem of
transferring leadership from one individual to another is
especially acute in Argentine politics where charisma plays
such an important role. The attention given by Alfonsin to
the institutionalization of his administration may be the most
important factor in determining the legitimacy of democratic
government in Argentina.
II. Conclusion
A sign of maturity in modernizing states is the 
institutionalization of political organizations based on 
consensual political norms. In Argentina's development, 
crises of participation have led to the decay of traditional 
rules and institutions. In the ensuing polarization, two 
broad political factions, each unwilling to share power and 
reach decisions by consultation and compromise, have produced 
political turmoil.
Alfonsin's reformist alternative offers a potential 
synthesis of these two extreme approaches to governing.
By offering opportunities for both participation as well as 
effective opposition, Alfonsin may lay the basis for a lasting 
democratic political order. With the institutionalization of 
adaptable, complex, autonomous, and legitimate structures 
and procedures, Argentina will be better able to escape its 
type casting as victim of a recurring war between competing
political factions for a new role in shaping its own destiny. 
The challenge for President Alfonsin is to use his
personal popularity to foster the institutionalization of a
more open political system. This means that he must work to
overcome the problem of transferring authority from
charismatic to non-charismatic leaders. In effect, Alfonsin
28
must learn how to "exercise power without charisma."
Future stability in Argentina hinges on the establishment 
of accepted procedures for the transfer of power within the 
governing system.
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CONCLUSION
Samuel Huntington argues that, when traditional political
institutions are weak in modernizing countries, authority
1
frequently passes to charismatic leaders. Historical
circumstances place these individuals in a unique position
to pursue institutional development. A conflict often arises
between the interests of the individual leader and the
interests of institutions. As Huntington puts it: "The
would-be institution-builder needs personal power to create
institutions but he cannot create institutions without
2
relinquishing personal power."
The weakness of political institutions under Yrigoyen
and Peron demonstrated the limits of popular mass movements.
These anti-status-quo movements were loosely organized, lacked
coherent ideologies, and relied primarily on the political
skills of their leaders and the enthusiasm of the mobilized
masses. The personalism which dominated both movements
ultimately permeated and debilitated government structures.
The contribution of these movements to Argentine politics
was therefore self-limiting. As Jacques Lambert points out
with characteristic hyperbole: both Radicalism and Peronism,
, 3
"destroyed a great deal but did not rebuild anythihg." 
Nevertheless, they broke the rural Conservatives' monopoly
102.
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on public office and forced their compatriots to reconsider 
the practices of the traditional political game.
As a mass movement, Radicalism was akin to a moral
crusade seeking the spiritual rebirth of Argentine society.
U.C.R. partisans addressed one another as spiritual
bretheren, termed the movement "the cause," and viewed
4
Yrigoyen as their spiritual leader. Beneath this exterior, 
however, the U.C.R. was a system of local party bosses and 
their machine organizations. The lack of unity between 
Yrigoyen's populist line and the personalism inherent in 
the operation of government culminated in instability.
Peronist populism, which glorified the native creole 
culture and proclaimed the dignity of the common worker, 
provided a ready vehicle for the political integration of 
the Argentine masses. Denouncing the evils of personalism, 
Peron set out to organize a broad-based political party.
Yet, the organization he created was completely 
personalistic, and this quality eventually blocked the 
transformation of the Peronist movement into an effective 
political party.
During both periods political instability was positively 
associated with: electoral strategies based on populistic
appeals to the masses, the informal and personalistic 
character of the state, and the lack of widespread acceptance 
of a single set of political rules. Opposition mounted when 
both the Radicals and the Peronists demonstrated that they had 
no intention of sharing power or reaching decisions through 
consensus measures.
104.
The Radicals and Peronists violated the traditional 
rules of the political game. The legitimacy crises that
arose in 1930 and again in 1955, resulted in the political
5
restoration of traditional elites. The failure of these
populist movements to institutionalize enduring political
structures permitted the reemergence of traditional rules and
practices. The Peronist/anti-Peronist conflict, like the
Radical-Conservative conflict which preceded it, reflected
the ongoing debate between populist attitudes and traditional 
6
institutions.
The current popular support for the Radicals marks the 
latest chapter in Argentina's political drama. Raul 
Alfonsin, the standard-bearer of Yrigoyen's Radicals, 
must contend with a highly differentiated but poorly 
integrated political system. The Alfonsin administration 
must finish the job left behind by the two previous populist 
regimes. That is, Alfonsin must shape institutions that 
reflect the changes in norms and values brought about by 
Argentina's rapid modernization.
As the experiences of the Radical and Peronist periods 
suggest, the conjunction of high political participation and 
low institutionalization seems to increase the inclination of 
of disaffected elite groups to resort to attempts at 
“irregular" government change, or coups. Alfonsin must 
take steps to ensure that his government does not follow 
this pattern. The lesson for Alfonsin: the existence of 
strong and well-developed civilian socio-political 
institutions diminishes the frequency of coups.
105.
The process of political institutionalization offers a 
method for coping with mass demands for greater social,
economic, or political equality and with traditional concerns 
for political order. A necessary step in this direction would 
include the full incorporation of the Peronists into the 
decision-making process. In this way, Alfonsin may begin to 
increase the adaptability and complexity of the Argentine 
political system. Alfonsin must use his personal prestige and 
the power of his office to mobilize consent behind pluralistic 
political institutions without detracting from their autonomy. 
In sum, Alfonsin must overcome the division of society by 
closed political or sectional interests dedicated to pursuing 
their own exclusive goals.
This study points out that political decay —  or the 
atrophy of political institutions —  was a major cause of 
Argentina's instability during the two periods reviewed.
As both Yrigoyen and Peron pursued their personalist 
strategies to retain power, they inhibited the growth of 
strong political institutions. Alfonsin must acknowledge the 
major lesson of Argentina's political experience: a
charismatic leader may successfully retain wide popular 
support while failing to take steps to institutionalize the 
political system. The fundamental task before Alfonsin is 
therefore to strengthen the legitimacy of Argentine democracy 
by demonstrating the viability of its political institutions.
RaiSl Alfonsin has more than three years left ih office.
If he survives, it will mark the first time that a civilian 
Argentine president has completed a full term since Juan
106.
Peron was reelected in 1952. That, in itself, will be a 
major contribution to the institutionalization of Argentine
democracy. But the larger task remains: Alfonsin must
convince Argentines that a working democratic order will 
continue to be an illusory goal until the people and the 
elites accept the need to strengthen the political system's 
ability to accomodate change.
107.
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